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In this paper, we study the effect of subsidised on-the-job training, training for the unemployed
and pure wage subsidies on the probability of leaving an employer. We base the analysis on a
sample of unemployed workers who have been hired during the 1991-92 period. Since
individuals benefiting from the policy were over represented in the sample, we face an
endogenous sampling problem apart from the well known selectivity problem in evaluation
analysis. The analysis deals with these two issues simultaneously. We find that each of the
labour market policies increases the length of job tenure. Yet, in line with the literature (Lalonde
1986, Fraker and Maynard 1987), the magnitude and the significance of this effect depend
crucially on the parametric assumptions in the model. Nevertheless, one robust conclusion is
that subsidised on-the-job training schemes significantly decrease the incidence of job
termination. We claim that this result supports Stevens' (1994, 1996) hypothesis of transferable
training and consequently of the underprovision of training by the market. Training programs
for the unemployed and pure wage subsidies only have an important positive but non significant
effect on job tenure. We argue that the stated effect of training programs provides weak support
for human capital theories as opposed to matching theories in the explanation of job turnover.
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1.  Introduction
In this paper we study the effect of subsidised on-the-job training, classroom training for the
unemployed and pure wage subsidies to employers (i.e. without a compulsory training content).
We analyse the effect of these programs on the probability of leaving an employer. The
empirical analysis is based on a sample of workers who were hired from the unemployment
pool.
Studying the effect of labour market programs on job turnover may improve our understanding
of the functioning of the labour market. In particular, it can throw some light on the relative
importance of human capital and matching theories in explaining job tenure and on the
importance of skill mismatch as an explanation of unemployment. It can also   clarify to what
extent government intervention in on-the-job training programs can improve allocative
efficiency. We start with a discussion of the latter.  
Recently, Stevens (1994, 1996) argued that all training cannot be considered as the sum of a
general and a specific component. She introduces the notion of transferable training. Instead of
being useful to either all firms in the economy or only to one specific firm, this type of training
is useful to a limited number of firms, and usually to an unequal degree. Stevens argues that
human capital theory typically disproves that the market under provides training (see Stevens,
1996, p. 21-22). She shows, however, that this argument crucially depends on whether training
is a mix of general and specific human capital (Becker, 1962, 1975). If instead training is
transferable, Stevens argues that the labour market may be imperfectly competitive, leading to
socially suboptimal investment in human capital.
A first objective of this paper is to test the validity of Stevens’s argument in the following way.
Any firm typically provides a certain amount of training to its workers. Assume a sample of
occupied workers where this amount of training is unobserved, but where we know whether a
worker has benefited from a subsidised on-the-job training or not. If on-the-job training is a mix
of general and specific training, then any subsidy supporting that type of training is unlikely to
sort any effects on job-turnover. For the subsidy is unlikely to influence the amount of training
provided to a given worker. This assertion is valid if the investment required to be eligible to the
subsidy is lower than the optimal level in the absence of the subsidy or if the firm and the
worker can comply with the formal requirements (e.g. a certain duration of training) without
adapting the genuine investment in human capital. On the contrary, if on-the-job training is of
the transferable  type, the subsidy will probably increase the suboptimal level of investment and
therefore job tenure.
According to human capital theory, the extent to which job tenure is increased crucially depends
on the nature of the training investment. If the training is firm-specific (on-the-job) or weakly
transferable, job tenure will increase more than if it is general (in a classroom). As the acquired
productivity increase is specific to the firm, the wage will rise relative to the alternative wage.
The probability of leaving an employer will therefore fall
5. In addition, employers will be less
likely to lay off workers in whom they have invested in specific skills. If, on the other hand,
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training is general, the increased productivity is useful to all firms and the worker has less or no
incentives to stay on the same job. The same distinction holds mutatis mutandis  as far as
weakly transferable and widely transferable training are concerned. If these arguments are
correct, one would expect that on-the-job training favours more job tenure than classroom
training for the unemployed, the latter being more transferable. Testing this hypothesis is a
second objective of the paper.
Matching theories (Spence, 1973, Stiglitz 1975, Jovanovic, 1979a, 1979b, 1984) provide an
alternative explanation for the relationship between training and job tenure. According to these
theories, training does not enhance the productivity of the worker but merely improves the
quality of the match between the worker and the firm. The quality of the match is improved
because participation to the training program signals information about the productivity of the
worker that previously was private information. If participation signals that the trainee is more
productive than the average worker, training will typically reduce the rate of job turnover. This
is likely to occur if workers can freely choose to participate in the program and/or if program
participation is only determined by easily observable characteristics such as age, unemployment
duration or diploma. On the other hand, if the selection of trainees favours workers whose
characteristics are negatively correlated with productivity (see e.g. Burtless, 1985 or Dubin and
Rivers, 1993) and if these characteristics are not readily observable to employers, then
participation to the training program discloses that the worker is of low productivity, increasing
therefore the job turnover of trainees.
According to matching theories, the relationship between training and job tenure can therefore
be positive or negative. Irrespective of the direction of the relationship, on-the-job training
programs as compared to classroom programs are likely to intensify the relationship, since
obviously more information will be disclosed if it is the employer himself who operates the
program (Barron et al, 1989).
The validity of the matching theories as opposed to human capital theories can only be tested
therefore if participation to training signals low productivity. For then the two theories predict
an opposite relationship between participation and job tenure. We will argue below that
participation to classroom training for the unemployed might indeed signal low productivity. A
third objective of the paper is therefore to test whether matching theories or human capital
theories turn out to be more in accordance with our data.
Until now we have been silent about the potential impact of pure wage subsidies to employers
on job turnover. We now turn to a discussion of this effect. It will appear that it can provide
evidence on the relative importance of skill mismatch as an explanation of unemployment.
Even if it is widely accepted that employment is enhanced during the period in which the
subsidy is granted, one might question whether a temporary subsidy can have a long run impact
on employment. On the one hand we have authors, such as Layard, Nickell and Jackman
(1991), who emphasise the role of genuine duration dependence in any explanation of the
evolution of European unemployment exit rates during the last decades. Genuine duration
dependence occurs if, for example, an increase in unemployment duration creates some loss of
accumulated human capital or generates a discouraged worker effect. In this case, a temporary
wage subsidy and/or training program can induce permanent effects as it inverts the process of
depreciation and discouragement. On the other hand, authors such as Sneessens and Shadman-
Mehta (1995) argue that the causes of unemployment are more structural to the disadvantage of
low skilled workers. In view of these models of unemployment, a temporary subsidy program
with little training content cannot sort permanent effects, as there exists a fundamental mismatch-  - 4
between the characteristics of jobs and the qualifications of the unemployed. It is therefore
possible to  discriminate between these two theories to the extent that we find a significantly
positive effect of a temporary employment subsidy on the length of the job spell after the
subsidised period. The available data do unfortunately not disentangle the period during which
the worker is subsidised from the after-subsidy spell. Hence, the results provided by this paper
will necessarily be tentative.
One of the major problems in estimating the effects of the mentioned labour market policies is to
correct adequately for the selection bias. The selection bias arises whenever participants to the
labour market program are non-randomly selected.   For, in this case a differential impact of
treatments as compared to controls may merely reflect differences in (un)observed
characteristics.  
Most commonly one tries to control for the selection bias in a non-experimental setting by
modelling jointly the participation decision and its impact on the variable of interest, such as
earnings or the exit rate out of (un)employment. Recent research (Lalonde, 1986, Fraker and
Maynard, 1987) has thrown doubt on the capacity of non-experimental methods to correct for
selection bias.  Estimates are found to be sensitive to model specification and estimation
method.  This line of research asserts that the selection bias can only be controlled for if one
disposes of data emerging from an experiment, be it controlled or natural (cf. Angrist, 1992,
Meyer, 1995).
This paper remains in the tradition of the non-experimental literature.  Heckman and Hotz
(1989) defend this approach to the extent that adequate specification tests allow to discard the
inappropriate models.  In this paper we follow this approach and test for the sensitivity of the
results to the model specification.  However, due to data limitations and to the computational
complexity of the optimisation problem, the sensitivity analysis is limited in nature.
Despite the widespread use of these active labour market policies, there exists relatively little
micro-econometric evidence on the effects of these measures.  Most progress has been made in
the evaluation of training programs. However, most studies concentrate on the effect of training
on subsequent earnings (cf. e.g. Ashenfelter, 1978, Bassi, 1984, Ashenfelter and Card, 1985,
Barnow, 1987, Edin, 1988, Björklund, 1990, Ackum, 1991, Jensen et al., 1993) or on
reemployment probabilities (cf. e.g. Greenhalgh and Stewart, 1987, Main and Shelly, 1990,
Main, 1991, Mealli et al., 1996). Only recent studies have considered the effect on the length of
the subsequent employment spell as well (cf. e.g. Kaitz, 1979, Ridder, 1986, Card and
Sullivan, 1988, Ham and Lalonde, 1991, Gritz, 1993, Bonnal, Fougère and Sérandon, 1994,
Torp, 1994, Zweimüller and Winter-Ebmer, 1996). One should distinguish employment
duration from the length of job tenure, the variable of interest in this paper. To the extent that
there are job-to-job transitions without an intervening spell out of employment, the two concepts
differ. Lynch (1991) and Elias (1994) estimate the effect of on-the-job training on the
probability of job termination, the variable of interest of this paper. Booth and Satchell (1994)
do the same in the case of apprenticeships. These authors do not correct for selection bias,
however.  
We now turn to a brief discussion of this   empirical evidence. We focus on the literature
studying job tenure rather than employment duration. It should be emphasised that the literature
has not yet adopted an homogeneous vocabulary. In this overview, job-related and private
sector (respectively, off-the-job and government sector) training programs have been
assimilated  with on-the-job (respectively, classroom) training programs. Lynch (1991), Elias
(1994) and Booth and Satchell (1994) find that on-the-job training lengthens the job spell. Elias-  - 5
(1994), however, reports an insignificant impact for men. Regarding classroom training, Lynch
(1991) reports an increased turnover for participants in classroom training programs. One
should keep in mind, however, that none of the mentioned studies corrected for the selectivity
bias. As far as we know, there is no empirical analysis of the effect of pure wage subsidies on
job tenure
6.
We now turn to a description of the programs and the institutional context. Section 3 describes
the data as well as the sampling scheme. In Section 4 we present the statistical model. Section 5
presents the results and Section 6 concludes.
2. A Description of the Programs and the Institutional Context
Table 1 presents some basic information about expenditures on labour market policies in
Belgium and in some neighbour countries. According to OECD data, the total amount spent on
active labour market policies is in % of GDP similar in Belgium, France and The Netherlands.
Yet, it is much lower than in Germany. In Belgium, although rising, the relative importance of
training programs for the unemployed is  comparatively low. Conversely, public expenditures
on recruitment subsidies and on training programs for occupied  adults are relatively high in
Belgium. This contrasts with the  importance of long-term unemployment and low-skill
unemployment in Belgium.
In Belgium, various institutions organise training programs for the unemployed. In accordance
with the literature, a distinction should be made between subsidised on-the-job training and
training schemes that are not directly related to a specific job in a given firm, designated below
simply by the label 'training'. In both cases, given the relatively low number of training slots
compared to the level of unemployment, unemployed applicants are selected on the basis of
various characteristics (e.g. educational attainment). On-the-job training can be subsidised by
the public authorities if the trainee is hired from the unemployment pool. Essentially two such
schemes were in action during the 1991-1992 period and are still implemented today. In the first
one (the "convention emploi-formation", henceforth CEF), a young low-skilled unemployed
has to be hired for an indeterminate duration and during a period that ranges between one and
three years he or she has to participate in a training program for at least 240 hours per year. This
program is not organised by the firm but it must be closely related to the job. During this period
of one to three years, social insurance contributions are only collected on the part of the wage
which exceeds minimum wages. In the second case (the "formation professionnelle individuelle
en entreprise", henceforth FPI), an unemployed is selected by a firm and trained on-the-job. A
training contract is signed and its implementation is controlled by the Employment Agency. The
training period lasts typically six months. During this period, the trainee keeps his
unemployment benefit and the firm pays only an increasing share of the difference between the
normal wage and the unemployment benefit. Meanwhile, no social insurance contributions are
paid. If the trainee completes the program successfully, the firm has to hire this worker for a
period at least as long as the duration of the training program.
Another category of subsidies, called pure wage subsidies, do not include these training
requirements. During the 1991-1992 period, there existed six different pure wage subsidy
schemes  in Belgium. All of them were temporary wage subsidies paid to the employer. Yet,
they differed in various ways : the type of contract that had to be signed (fixed-term or not); the
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categories of unemployed and of firms eligible and the wage subsidy level
7. In Belgium, pure
wage subsidies are often targeted on specific disadvantaged groups defined on the basis of
criteria such as age, skill and unemployment duration.  With one exception, these pure wage
subsidies were paid on a quarterly or monthly basis. The maximum duration of payment of the
subsidy varied between 12 and 24 months.
3. The Data and the Sampling Scheme
This analysis uses a sample of workers based on a survey of employers. This section explains
first how the sample was selected. This is important, because the selection rule was based on
endogenous variables influencing therefore the statistical model presented in Section 4. Second,
we will describe the information available in our sample. Before we proceed, notice that we
henceforth denote by 'wage subsidies' both subsidised on-the-job training and pure wage
subsidies (i.e. without a training content).
The survey on which this research is based was designed for another purpose. It aimed at
collecting direct evidence on the importance of dead-weight and substitution effects of wage
subsidies and training programs. This was realised on the basis of interview responses given by
employers on recently hired workers. As this data set contains (imperfect) information on the
length of job tenure, we have exploited this data source differently in order to estimate the
impact of active labour market measures on the length of job tenure.
Since the labour market policies considered were often targeted on specific groups of workers,
it was not a good idea to take a random sample of employers: In order to observe a sufficient
number of beneficiaries of the policies, the required sample size would have been too large and
therefore too costly. The budget allowed only about 400 firms, spread all over Belgium, to be
interviewed. For this reason, first, a stratified random sample was taken of employers that were
registered at the social insurance administration. Subsequently, firms were contacted by phone.
To be sampled a firm had to satisfy a number of criteria (see below), aimed at over representing
firms that hired workers from a target group defined below. If the firm met these criteria, the
interviewer asked for an appointment with its human resource manager
8. In case of a positive
answer, a face-to-face interview was held. Interviews were carried out between May and July
1993. The questionnaire raised questions on the firm and on (at most) five hirings during the
1991-1992 period. We now detail more on the sampling of firms, on the selection of individual
hirings and on the available information in the questionnaire.
Firms were selected in the following way:
• First, the sample was restricted to private firms of the service, manufacturing and
construction sectors with more than five employees. Firms of the public sector were not
considered, because they were typically not entitled to the wage subsidies. Smaller firms
were left aside because of their idiosyncrasies.
• The employers were stratified in nine strata. In one dimension the three sectors, service,
manufacturing and construction, were distinguished. In the other dimension the strata were
defined according to firm size: 5 to 19 workers, 20 to 499 and 500 or more workers. A target
number of interviews was fixed for each stratum.
                                                
7 The wage subsidy levels ranged from about 10% of the wage cost and more than 50% in particular cases (like
disabled workers).
8 In firms with no human resource manager, the person responsible for hiring and layoff decisions was contacted.-  - 7
• A firm was selected for interview if at least one of the following criteria were met during the
1991-1992 period : (i) to have hired jobless job-searchers who participated in a training
program (during their previous unemployment spell); (ii) to have hired unemployed people
with a wage subsidy; or (iii) to have recruited people from the 'hard core' of unemployed
9
who did not participate in a training program and whose hire had not been subsidised. The
design of the sample required that the total sample was approximately equally divided among
these three categories. In practice, many firms shared two or three of these characteristics.
This is emphasised in Figure 1.
Next, the interviewer asked each human resource manager to choose (randomly) five
recruitments
10 that occurred in 1991 or 1992
11. The following constraints were imposed on this
selection. First, the selected workers should have been hired from the pool of unemployed
(including welfare recipients). Second, recruitments from the 'target group' were over
represented. The target group consisted of workers who either had been trained during their
previous unemployment spell, or for whom the employer obtained a wage subsidy, or who
belonged to the 'hard core' of unemployed. Since Belgian wage subsidies are often restricted to
categories of the 'hard core' of unemployed, this third group of workers has some features of a
comparison group. The human resource manager was asked to select (if possible
12) at least three
recruitments from this target group.
This description clarifies that we face two endogenous sampling problems. First, we only have
information on hired workers. Unemployed workers with a low hiring probability are therefore
under represented in the sample. Consequently, to the extent that program participation
increases (decreases) the hiring probability, participants will be over (under) represented in the
sample and this may bias the estimator of the program effect, unless the statistical model
explicitly takes this feature into account
13. Secondly, it is clear that the sample over represents
workers belonging to the 'target group' and therefore workers benefiting from the policy
measures. A further discussion of these problems is delayed to the next section.
We now turn to a description of the available information as provided by the human resource
manager. First, it should be stressed that we are only imperfectly informed about the length of
the job tenure. For, we only know the month in which the employee was hired and whether he
or she still occupied a position in the firm at the end of March 1993. Therefore, if someone left
before March 1993, we only know that the job duration is lower than the number of months
elapsed between the recruitment date and March 1993. In that case, we ignore whether the exit
is a quit or a layoff. Nor do we know whether the individual is subsequently employed. If
someone is still occupied at the end of March 1993, the job duration is right censored.
                                                
9 Rather conventionally, in Belgium, someone is a member of this 'hard core' if he is a young low-skilled worker
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recipient).
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Winter-Ebmer (1996) have a similar sampling scheme.   They do not discuss the potential danger of bias,
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Table 2 lists the characteristics of the sampled workers and of the firms in which they were
hired. The reported summary statistics of the firm characteristics are calculated with respect to
the sampled individuals and not with respect to the sampled firms. Note that, in view of the
non-random nature of the sample, these statistics are a reflection of the sample and not of the
Belgian economy.
As explained in Section 2, the various types of training schemes and wage subsidy programs
are aggregated in three : training, subsidised on-the-job training and pure wage subsidy. It is
important to realise two characteristics of this information. First, as to on-the-job training, we
are only informed on the presence of this type of training to the extent that  it was subsidised.
Consequently, an individual trained on-the-job, but for whom the firm does not collect a
subsidy, is regarded as someone who does not participate to any of the programs. This is
crucial for a good understanding of our procedure proposed in the Introduction to test the
validity of Stevens’s transferable training hypothesis. Second, we need to be aware that only
time-invariant indicators of the participation in these programs are available. This implies that,
for pure wage subsidies, we are not able to distinguish between the probability of job
termination during and after program participation. However, for the training program, we
measure the post-program participation effect only, since training occurs by definition prior to
employment and therefore prior to the selection into the sample. For subsidised on-the-job
training we measure a mix of the effect during and post program participation, since for the CEF
scheme introduced in Section 2 the hiring date, and therefore the instant at which the worker is
sampled, coincides with the beginning of the training period; for the FPI scheme this date
coincides with the beginning of the post-training period. We will come back to this issue when
we interpret our results.
4.  The  Statistical  Model
In this section we explain how we model job duration and how we will try to correct for the
selection bias and for the selectivity introduced by the sampling scheme. First, to the extent that
the mentioned selectivity is related to observable variables only, a correctly specified duration
model conditioned on these observable covariates will yield consistent estimates of the program
participation variables on the probability of job termination. This is the model we will present in
the first subsection.
In the second subsection we propose a model that also corrects for selection on unobservables.
This model is largely inspired by Gritz (1993), although that Gritz has far more complete
information on the labour market history as we do. As is shown below, this requires a
specification of the joint probability distribution of the job duration and of the participation
decision. The 'participation decision' refers to the joint decision of the unemployed and the
Employment Agency
14 to enter a training scheme, and to the joint decision of the firm, the job-
searcher and the Administration in charge of the payment of the subsidies that leads to a
subsidised employment contract.
In subsection 3 we discuss the adaptations required to allow for the selectivity induced by the
endogenous sampling. We demonstrate why we are unable to correct  for the selectivity induced
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by the sampling of hired individuals only.  We propose a method to correct for the bias
introduced by over representing hires from the 'target group' (cf. Section 3).
Finally, we discuss our procedure of model selection.  We justify the use of two criteria:
Aikaike's information criterion and Jeffreys-Bayes posterior-probability criterion.
4.1 The Duration Model
For purposes of simplification, we will assume throughout that the stochastic process that has
generated the data is stationary with respect to calendar time
15. In Section 3 we explained that
we only have incomplete information on the job duration. On the one hand, we observe for each
worker i  a non-stochastic variable di  denoting the number of months that have elapsed between
the hiring date and March 1993. On the other hand, we observe the realisation of a stochastic
indicator variable Ji  that is equal to one if the job duration is right censored at the end of March












It follows that the probability of observing Ji =1 conditional on di, i.e. the individual's
contribution to the likelihood function, is equal to the survival probability :
prob J d prob T d F d ii i i i i () == > () = () 1 (2)
Similarly, contribution to the likelihood function of a worker for whom we observe Ji =0
conditional on di, is equal to one minus the survival probability :
prob J d prob T d F d ii i i i i () ( ) == ≤ = − () 0 1 (3)
We now turn to the specification of the survival function. This amounts to specifying the hazard
rate out of job tenure, as the survival function can be easily expressed in terms of these hazard
rates (cf. Kiefer 1988 or Lancaster 1990). We will assume that the hazard for individual i at time
t has the following proportional parameterisation :
h th t z ii ()=− () 0( ) exp
' νβ (4)
where ht 0()  is the baseline hazard at time t and ν  is the value of an unobserved individual
specific effect. For the time being, we will assume that, conditional on the observable covariates
zi, neither Ti  nor the unobserved specific effect are correlated with the participation decision
into one of the three programs. This assumption will be relaxed in section 4.2.
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   Belgium. Yet, the unemployment rate was increasing from 7.2% in 1991 to 7.7% in 1992 (according to
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To avoid too restrictive distributional assumptions (cf. Lalonde 1986 and Fraker and Maynard
1987), we choose the flexible piecewise constant specification of the baseline hazard as
introduced by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978).  For this purpose we divide the time axis into K
intervals: tt t t t t kk KK 01 1 1 , ,..., , ,..., , [ ) [ ) [ ) − −  of (possibly unequal) length Δkkk tt =− −1 with
t ddd Ki n = {} max ,..., ,..., 1 , where n is the number of individuals in the sample.  By our
assumption of stationarity and since we have a sample of individuals flowing into employment,
we can normalise t0 0 = . If we now follow Meyer (1990) and define the average integrated










we can derive the following expression for the survivor function:
F t z t t for t t t ii kk mm m
k
k k ()=− − ()− () + [] {} ≤< − =
−
− ∑ exp exp ,
' νβ θ θ 1 1
1
1 Δ               (6)
Let φ(.)  denote the density function of the standard normal distribution.  If we assume that the
unobserved individual specific effects are normally distributed with variance
16, σ
2, then
Equations (2) and (3) allow us to derive the following expression for the likelihood function :
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1 (7)
where ϕ is an unknown parameter vector including σ
2. This equation together with equation
(6) completes our specification of the likelihood function.
4.2  Correcting  for  Selection  on  Unobservables
Insofar as neither Ti  nor the unobserved specific effect are correlated with the participation
decision into one of the three programs, the maximisation of the likelihood function in (7) will
yield a consistent estimate of the program effects of program participation. This is, however,
not very realistic. We will therefore now allow this unobserved individual specific effect to be
correlated with the participation decisions. On the other hand, we maintain the assumption that
conditional on the observed and unobserved covariates, Ti  is independent of the participation
decision.
As in Gritz (1993), Bonnal et al. (1994) or Ham and Lalonde (1991) we introduce correlation
between the unobserved effects by a one-factor specification (Flinn and Heckman, 1982). The
advantage of this specification is its parsimony. This is important in view of the complexity of
the optimisation problem (see below). Its disadvantage is that the pattern of correlation it allows
is very restrictive. The correlations are either perfectly positive, negative or equal to zero.
For purposes of numerical tractability, we simplify the modelling of the participation decisions
to the three programs. In the analysis we will not distinguish the participation decision in
subsidised on-the-job training from the one in pure wage subsidies. We therefore distinguish
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only participation in training and in a wage subsidy program. Participation in a training scheme
will be denoted by the binary random variable Yi
T
. The binary random variable Yi
S will
designate whether a worker i  is subsidised or not. Let p1i be the probability prob[Yi
T=1]  and p2i
be the probability prob[Yi
S=1]. Since the decision to participate in a training program occurs
before the one of signing a subsidised employment  contract, we model the corresponding




































where z1i and z2i are two vectors of time-invariant individual characteristics, both encompassed
by zi, and ηT and ηS are coefficients allowing the unobserved individual specific variables to
affect the training, respectively wage subsidy decision differently than the hazard out of job
tenure. Note that yi
T is included in z2i. The joint probability of participation is
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Ignoring the selectivity caused by endogenous sampling, the likelihood function therefore takes
the following form :





































4.3  Correcting  for  Selectivity  due  to  Endogenous  Sampling
In Section 3 we already alluded to the endogenous sampling problem. On the one hand, we
highlighted the potential selectivity problem induced by only sampling hired workers. On the
other hand, there is a potential bias due to the over representation of workers belonging to the
'target group' defined in Section 3. In this section we propose an estimation procedure to
correct for the latter bias. We also sketch how to solve the former problem but argue that it is
impossible to implement this approach with the present data.
Let Si be a random binary variable that takes the value 1 if and only if individual i  is sampled
(i.e. is selected by the interviewee given the requirements of the questionnaire). Otherwise Si
equals zero. To take the sampling design into account, we now write the vector of time-invariant
individual characteristics zi as [yi
T, yi
S,ri,x i] and supplement it with fi, where ri is an indicator
equal to 1 if and only if individual i  belongs to the 'hard core' unemployed, xi is the vector of
the other individual observable characteristics (including those of the employer), and fi indicates
the firm employing worker i. The joint probability of the participation process should then be








ii i i (, , , , , ) == = 1 ν . Strictly speaking, this probability is also
conditional on the event that individual i  has been hired. To simplify the notation, we will
disregard this conditioning event for the time being. We will discuss the implications of this
conditioning below.  Applying Bayes formula leads to the following expression :-  - 12
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This shows that the influence of the sampling scheme is channelled through the term




ii ,, , ) . Note that in (11) we implicitly assume that the sampling is
independent of xi and ν. We believe that this is a reasonable assumption for this sampling
scheme (cf. Section 3). On the other hand, the sampling probability is explicitly conditioned on
the firm employing the worker. This conditioning is important. For instance, the probability of
hiring at least three individuals from the 'target group' will clearly be different between firms
who have hired many workers from this group and those who have hired only a few of them.
Let us now precisely consider the consequences for the statistical analysis of over representing
individuals out of the 'target group'. Let Ci be a random binary variable which takes the value 1
if and only if i  is a member of the target group. Otherwise, Ci is zero. We will assume that,
conditional on being (or not) sampled from the target group, i.e. conditional on Ci =c i,, the
sampling is random. Consequently, we have that




ii i ii = () == () 11 , , , , (12)
If ri=1, i.e. if i is hired from the 'hard core' of the unemployed, then Ci=1. Conditional on Ci=
1, the sampling is random.  Hence, the conditional probability of being sampled is equal across
groups and expression (11) simplifies to :
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and for these individuals the contribution of the likelihood corresponds to those defined in
Section 4.2.
If ri = 0, things are more complicated. For a given firm, f, let N
f
1  (respectively, N
f
2 ) be the total
number of hirings in (respectively, out of) the target group (NNN
fff =+ 12 ) during the 1991-92
period. If for this firm the sample is made of respectively n
f
1  and n
f
2  individuals, then
neglecting the subscript i in fi  to avoid multiple levels of indices in the notation
prob S C f
n
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f  is known and can be conditioned upon, but we only know that Nn N n
ff f f
11 2 ∈− [] ,
17.
                                                
17 If the human resource managers followed the interview instructions very precisely, we could have imposed the
   following a priori information : ∀< = nN n
ff f
11 1 3, . For, he was regarded to provide at least three individuals
   out of the target group, if possible. So, if he has provided information on less individuals, one could infer that
   no more individuals were hired from the target group in this firm. However, we do not utilise this prior-  - 13
Hence,
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where p is the probability of being in the target group in a given firm and where we used that the
distribution of N
f
1 , conditional on N
f, is binomial. Since the probability p is unknown, but
varies over firms, we assume that p is distributed according to a Beta distribution B(a,b) (i.e. p
has a mean equal to 
a
ab +
 and a variance equal to
ab
ab ab () ( ) ++ + 1
2 )
18. It follows that :



































































For those not hired from the 'hard core' of the unemployed (ri =0 ), these equations provide
expressions for the probability of being sampled, conditional on being (or not) in the 'target
group', and conditional on being employed in a firm that hired N
f workers during the 1991-92
period.  
In order to study the sensitivity of the results to the specification of the distribution of individual
specific effects, we will estimate the model presented in this section assuming both, a normal
distribution and a discrete distribution with two points of support
19. We provide in (18) the
expression for the likelihood function under the latter assumption.  The reader can easily find
the expression of the likelihood function assuming a normal distribution.
Lq
Fdxry y Fdxry y
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    information as to avoid a specification error whenever the resource managers did not follow up these  
    instructions that precisely.
18  This assumption is admittedly quite arbitrary. In order to test for the restrictiveness of this assumption, we
    estimated one of the models with a constant p and found the estimation results to be robust.
19  Due to computational problems, we were not able to increase the number of points of support.-  - 14
where qq 21 1 =−  and νν 2 11 1 11 =− − () () qq  by normalisation. The two first bracketed terms
are completely specified by Equation (6). The specification of the third bracketed term is given
by (8) and (9). The last term is found, on the one hand by substituting (16) and (17), in (12)
and subsequently in (11), and on the other hand by substituting (8) and (9) in (11).
We now turn to the discussion of the implication that only workers that have been hired are
sampled. Consider an indicator variable, Hi, that is equal to one if individual i  has been hired
in the 1991-92 period and zero otherwise. By Bayes rule the probability of program
participation is then given by the following expression:
prob Y y H x r
prob H y x r prob Y y x r
prob H y x r prob Y y x r
ii i i i
i i ii i iii
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where Y YY ii
T
i
S =[] , . Clearly, neglecting the conditioning on hiring is only justified to the extent
that program participation does not affect the probability of being hired : prob H y x r ii i (, , , ) =1 ν
= prob H x r ii i (, , ) = 1 ν . This is unlikely to be true. However, without any data on unemployed
workers who were not hired, we cannot correct for this sampling selectivity. It can be argued
that the neglect of this endogenous sampling biases the estimators of program participation
downwards (cf. Section 5).
4.4  Criteria  of  Model  Selection
The importance of specification testing has been underlined in the literature (Heckman and Hotz
1989). In this section we discuss criteria of model selection. We wish to investigate to what
extent correcting for unobserved individual specific effects is important and to determine the
optimal specification of the mixing distribution.
The standard likelihood ratio test is inappropriate when testing the relevance of unobserved
heterogeneity. For, the parameter values (e.g. σ
2 of the normal distribution) lie on the
boundary of the null hypothesis of no heterogeneity (e.g. σ
2=0). The problem is that this
results in a violation of the regularity conditions required for the likelihood ratio to be
asymptotically chi-squared. We follow Gritz's (1993) proposal to use Akaike's (1973)
information criterion as a guide for model selection. The preferred model according to this
criterion is the one that minimises the following statistic:
− () [] + 22 ln ˆ LN ϕ ϕ (20)
where L ˆ ϕ () is the optimised value of the likelihood function and Nϕ is the number of estimated
parameters.  
Akaike's criterion is derived on the assumption that there exists a general model from which all
competing models can be derived by imposing various restrictions on the vector of unknown
parameters. When comparing a model with a normally distributed mixture to one in which the
mixture is specified discrete with two points of support, this assumption is not satisfied. For
these cases, we follow Chow's (1985) proposition to base model selection on the Jeffrey-Bayes-  - 15
posterior-probability criterion. In particular, we will use Schwarz's (1978) approximation of
this criterion:
− () [] + () 2ln ln LN n ϕ ϕ (21)
Again, the preferred model is the one that minimises this statistic.
5.  The  Empirical  Results
In this section, we first explain how the number of time intervals has been selected. Next, we
present the maximum likelihood estimates of the different statistical models presented in Section
4.
With a piecewise-constant specification of the hazard, the total number of intervals has to be
chosen. We have adopted the following procedure. Neglecting individual observed and
unobserved characteristics, we started with a large number of intervals: K = 27. Figure 2 shows
that the hazard peaks in the first month, subsequently it decreases sharply and stays at a low
level until the end of the first year of employment. From then on, it fluctuates around a higher
level with peaks around an employment duration of one year, one year and a half and two years.
The latter peaks did not prove to be statistically significant, however. On the basis of the
likelihood ratio test we could reduce, at a significance level of 89%, the number of intervals to
four (see Figure 2)
20.
Table 3 presents the results ignoring the selection and the endogenous sampling problems (cf.
Section 4.1). A negative estimated parameter means that the corresponding variable increases
the hazard rate out of the firm and hence reduces job duration. This table shows the estimated
vector of parameters with and without unobserved heterogeneity. According to Akaike's
Information Criterion the mixture model is to be preferred. From table 3, it appears that the
young and the former long-term unemployed have a shorter tenure. The parameters of the firm's
characteristics have the expected sign. As far as the policies are concerned, only subsidised on-
the-job training has a significant positive effect on job duration.
Before we discuss the results of the model that takes the selection bias (but not the endogenous
sampling bias) into account, we try to pinpoint the direction of the selection bias. From the
discussion in Section 2, it is clear that the selection into subsidised employment with or without
on-the-job training is mainly governed by the employer and the public authorities. First,
consider the selection by the public authorities.  In  Belgium subsidies were predominantly
targeted at the 'hard core' of unemployed.  To the  extent that we imperfectly controlled for this
selectivity  by  including  indicator variables such as 'long-term unemployed' or 'low-skilled
worker', the measured effect tends to be underestimated. Secondly, given that it is the employer
who determines selection in a subsidy scheme, it is clear that he will be ready to enrol less
productive workers who are entitled to a subsidy. For, the wage subsidy can compensate for the
lower productivity. To the extent that this lower productivity is correlated with characteristics
that are not observed by the researcher, but observed by the employer, we therefore expect the
selectivity bias to be negative. So, without correcting for the selectivity, we tend to
underestimate the effect of the wage subsidies on job duration
21. However, the selectivity bias
                                                
20  The corresponding table is available upon request.
21  For subsidised training programs (as opposed to the pure subsidies) matters are more complicated. For the
    training program permits the employer to select the most productive trainees. The training program therefore-  - 16
will be smaller to the extent that dead-weight effects (i.e. cases where a subsidised worker
would have been hired even in the absence of the wage subsidy) are important. For, in that case
the employer mainly hires workers he would have hired anyway and who therefore will not be
less productive.
This prediction is not necessarily true for hired trainees. For, the selection of unemployed
individuals in a training program is less likely to be captured by the included explanatory
variables, not in the least because participation depends on test scores which we ignore. So, to
the extent that program administrators cream the most productive workers for participation in
training, the selection bias may reverse. Creaming is unlikely to occur in Belgium, however.
First, given the relatively low number of training slots, applicants have to wait rather a long time
before they enter the training program. Only those with sufficiently bad unobserved
characteristics will still be unemployed at that time. Second, in Belgium, financial rewards of
training administrators are in no way related to placement ratios or to other labour market
outcomes. Hence, program administrators have no financial incentive to cream the pool of
applicants.
In Table 4 we report the results when the duration process is modelled jointly with the
participation process into training and wage subsidy programs (cf. Section 4.2). A positive
estimated parameter means that the corresponding variable increases the probability of entering a
program. Yet, only the parameters of the duration process are of interest. Therefore, we
henceforth focus on them. The age, long-term unemployment and firm's effects are not deeply
modified. However, the three policies have now a much larger positive and significant effect on
job duration. This confirms our prediction of a downward bias for the effect of wage subsidies
and of training in Table 3. We now investigate whether there is any further bias induced by the
endogenous sampling.
Before turning to the results that take the endogenous sampling problem into account (cf.
Section 4.3), we again try to predict the direction of the bias. First, as workers from the 'target
group' are over represented and since the 'target group' typically consists of less productive
workers, we expect that a neglect of the endogenous sampling problem biases the effects of
program participation further downwards.  Secondly, we claim that even after correction for the
latter bias, we will only obtain a lower bound of the estimated effect. This is a consequence of
observing hired individuals only. For, if the program compensates for productivity differentials
between workers, hired program participants will on average be less productive (in the absence
of program participation) than hired non-participants
22.
In Table 5 the estimated effects of program participation are even larger than in Table 4, as
expected. Moreover, recall that by conditioning on hired workers only, we still underestimate
these effects. Before inferring any conclusion from these estimates, we need to investigate their
robustness.  Specifically, we investigated the sensitivity of these estimates to the distributional
assumption on the mixing distribution. In Table 6, we tabulated the vector of parameters
estimated under the assumption that the mixing distribution was discrete with two points of
support instead of normal
23. The labour market policies still turn out to enhance job tenure. Yet,
                                                                                                                                                        
   reverses the direction of the selection bias induced by the subsidy. Which of either biases will eventually
   dominate is impossible to predict.    
22 Note that if the program is a pure selection device the participants may rather be more productive  prior to
   entry to the program than non-participants and  the direction of the bias may therefore reverse. We suggest
   below, however, that the data are inconsistent with the pure matching theories.
23 In order to simplify the computation, note that we no longer included the variables 'previously welfare-  - 17
as compared to the results of Table 5, the estimated effects are much smaller and their estimated
standard deviation have increased. Moreover, according to the criteria of model selection
discussed in Section 4.4, the discrete mixture specification is the preferred one.
How should these results be interpreted? First, note that even if only the effect of subsidised on-
the-job training is significantly different from zero, the point estimates of the effects of program
participation are all important. Their insignificance reflects our difficulty to disentangle the true
effect from the selectivity effect. In order to increase our intuition in the magnitude of the
effects, we calculated for an individual with average characteristics in the sample the first
quartile duration of job tenure with and without program participation.  We chose to report the
first quartile duration, i.e. the duration at which the first 25% of hired workers with average
characteristics left the job, instead of median duration, because the latter required to extrapolate
results beyond the observation period and risked therefore not to be very robust. The first
quartile duration of a non-participant with average characteristics is estimated to be 13.8
months. According to the preferred specification (cf. Table 6), if he or she participates to a pure
subsidy program this duration increases by 30% to 17.9 months, for on-the-job trainees by
68% to 23.2 months and to training by 15% to 15.9 months. This shows that participation
indeed substantially increases the length of a job spell. Moreover, recall that we argued that by
considering hired individuals only these estimates are lower bounds. However, the results have
proven to be sensitive to the chosen specification and we cannot therefore guarantee that these
estimates are the most conservative.
The effect of (classroom) training for the unemployed on job tenure is positive but
insignificantly different from zero. We argued that participation signals low productivity. This
result therefore provides some weak evidence in favour of human capital theories as opposed to
matching theories. According to matching theories, the turnover of trainees should indeed have
been higher instead of lower.
We find that participation in the pure subsidy program increases job duration quite dramatically.
The effect is far from precisely determined though and therefore careful interpretation is
required. Moreover, it is important to recall that our data do not allow us to disentangle the
subsidised period from the after subsidy period. The measured effect could therefore just reflect
that employers are less likely to sack subsidised workers than unsubsidised ones and that in the
post-subsidy period the two types of workers leave the job at the same rate. This interpretation
is to some extent supported by the analysis of Van der Linden (1995) based on the same sample
as the present research. This paper uses the qualitative information available in the questionnaire
to estimate the importance of dead-weight. The estimated frequency is about 60%. It is therefore
plausible that the subsidy only has a minor and non significant effect on the after subsidy job
tenure. This offers some support to the view that mismatch is a major explanation of
unemployment in Belgium. But this is to a large extent a conjecture given the difficulty to
disentangle the true effect from the selectivity effect and the temporary from the permanent
effect.
Subsidised on-the-job training significantly and importantly favours longer job tenure. This
result is in accordance with human capital theory  and with the empirical literature surveyed in
the introduction. On the one hand it confirms that on-the-job training seems to be more specific
(less transferable) than classroom training. On the other hand, the mere fact that the effect is
significantly positive accords with Stevens' (1994, 1996) hypothesis of transferable training
                                                                                                                                                        
  recipient' and 'increasing business activity' in the participation model. This is unlikely to affect the results as
the coefficients of these variables were not significantly different from zero in the model with the normal
mixing distribution.-  - 18
and that the market under provides training. This conclusion should nevertheless be interpreted
with some caution, since the group of subsidised on-the-job training programs encompasses
different policies. In the CEF program introduced in Section 2, as for the pure subsidy
schemes, we measure the effect of the program on job tenure both during and after participation.
On the contrary, in FPI program, we estimate the post-participation effect. The effect on post-
program job tenure is therefore over estimated. On the other hand, since we sampled hired
workers only, our estimates are a lower bound to the true effect of program participation (cf.
supra).
6.  Conclusions
This paper has analysed whether active labour market policies have an influence on job tenure.
The evaluation has focused on three Belgian policies : Pure wage subsidies (more specifically,
temporary subsidies paid to employers who recruit eligible unemployed people with no
additional requirement to train the worker), subsidised on-the-job training (followed by or
embedded in a labour contract) and training programs organised for the unemployed by public
institutions. The main problem in estimating the effect of these policies is the correction for
selection bias. Given the data, this paper has adopted a non-experimental approach. To correct
for selection on unobservables, we have selected a specification of the joint probability
distribution of the job duration and the participation decision. A one-factor loading specification
has been used for the mixing distribution. As it is now well established, such an approach does
not guarantee that the correction for selection bias is appropriate. A sensitivity analysis was
therefore required. In this paper, we compared the estimates resulting from a normal and a
discrete with two points of support specification of the mixing distribution.
This analysis was based on a sample of hired workers obtained from a survey of employers. To
the extent that program participation affects the hiring probability, the fact of basing the analysis
on a sample of hired workers only, may bias downwards the estimation of the program effects.
This bias was unavoidable. On the other hand, the problem that the sample over represented
program participants and was therefore endogenous was explicitly taken into account in the
statistical model.
A first conclusion of the paper is that the labour market policies all lengthen job tenure. Yet, the
magnitude of the estimates is sensitive to the model specification, a result already emphasised by
Lalonde (1986) and Fraker and Maynard (1987). Within the limits of this paper, the assumption
about the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity turns out to be crucial. Facing different
specifications, we have implemented a procedure of model selection based on two criteria (the
Akaike information criterion and the Jeffrey-Bayes posterior-probability criterion). According to
these criteria, the preferred specification corrects for unobserved heterogeneity by means of a
discrete mixing distribution with two points of support.
Second, from the selected specification, a rather clear-cut conclusion can been drawn about
subsidised on-the-job training which significantly favours longer job tenure. This conclusion is
in accordance with theoretical predictions of human capital theory and with previous evaluations
of the same policy. On the one hand this result confirms that on-the-job training seems to be
more specific (less transferable) than classroom training. On the other hand, the mere fact that
the effect is significantly positive accords with Stevens' (1994, 1996) hypothesis of transferable
training and that the market under provides training. Belgian training programs for the
unemployed and pure wage subsidies have important positive but non significant effects on job
tenure. Given that participation to these training programs seems to signal low productivity, the-  - 19
result provides weak evidence in favour of the human capital theory as opposed to matching
theories in explaining job turnover. Our result on the effect of participation in the pure subsidy
program is difficult to interpret, since we could not disentangle the effect during the program
participation from the post-program effect. Yet, it is plausible that the subsidy only has a minor
and non significant effect on the after subsidy job tenure. A tentative conclusion would be that
our results offer some support to the view that mismatch is a major explanation of
unemployment in Belgium.
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Figure 1: The Sample Composition (376 firms)
firms using wage subsidies
firms hiring workers issued from
the 'hard core of unemployment'
firms hiring former trainees
Figure 2: The shape of the
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Table 1: Expenditures on labour market programs (% of G.D.P.) and basic
unemployment  indicators  in  selected  countries,  1992.
Belgium Germany France The Netherlands
Expenditures
Passive  measures 2.9 2.0 2.0 2.2
Active  measures 1.1 1.7 1.0 1.1
- training for unemployed
adults
0.14 0.63 0.32 0.19
- training for occupied
adults
0.09 0.03 0.06 -
- wage subsidies in the
private sector 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.03
Passive  +  active  measures 4.0 3.7 3.0 3.4
Unemployment  rate (%) 7.9 4.6 10.4 6.7
Share  of  long-term
unemployment (%)
59.0 33.5 36.1 44.0
Relative  unemployment




compared to the higher










Source : O.C.D.E. (1994), Employment outlook and Drèze and Sneessens (1994).-  - 23


















* < 25 years






Low-skilled  worker 54%
Previously  long-term
unemployed 40%





* foremen, supervisory or




















Brussels & the Walloon
Provinces 50%
Increasing  business  activity
during  the  1991-1992  period
45%
Firm  size:
less than 50  employees at the end
of 1992




Sample  size 864-  - 24
Table 3. The parameter estimates ignoring the selection and the endogenous sampling
problems
1






       (0 ≤ t < 1 month) 0.114  (0.057)** 0.073  (0.045)*
θ2     (1 ≤ t < 12) 0.004  (0.002)* 0.004  (0.002)*
θ3     (12 ≤ t < 27) 0.022  (0.011)** 0.018  (0.009)**
θ4     (27 ≤ t < 61) 0.002  (0.001)** 0.004  (0.002)**
Age
* < 25 years





sex (women = 1) -0.237   (0.180) -0.293   (0.213)
Low-skilled worker -0.220  (0.164) -0.303  (0.195)
Previously long-term
unemployed
-0.390  (0.159)** -0.476  (0.189)**
Previously welfare
recipient
0.174  (0.291) 0.213  (0.335)
Disabled -0.303  (0.349) -0.259  (0.419))
Production worker -0.050  (0.419) -0.106  (0.509)
Administrative personnel -0.013  (0.391) -0.073  (0.475)
Pure wage subsidy 0.120  (0.189) 0.147  (0.225)
Subsidized  on-the-job
training
0.489  (0.254)** 0.596  (0.305)**










Brussels & the Walloon
region
0.205  (0.157) 0.325  (0.190)*
Increasing business
activity
0.247  (0.123)** 0.392  (0.185)**
Firm-specific exit rate -0.165   (0.060)*** -0.197   (0.078)**
Firm  size 0.243  (0.122)** 0.281  (0.138)**
σ
2 _ 1.012  (0.129)***
Sample size 864
Number of parameters 23 24




*** means not significantly different from zero at the 1 % level; ** means not significantly
different from zero at the 5 % level; * means not significantly different from zero at the 10 %
level.
1  The reference case is a middle-aged man who did not exit from the 'hard core of
unemployment', who works in the supervisory or management personnel of a small manufacturing
firm in Flandres and who did not participate in a program.-  - 25
Table 4. The parameter estimates of the joint duration and participation process ignoring
endogenous sampling - Normal mixing distribution
1.









       (0 ≤ t < 1 month) 0.155  (0.066)**
θ2     (1 ≤ t < 12) 0.009  (0.005)*
θ3     (12 ≤ t < 27) 0.048  (0.020)**
θ4     (27 ≤ t < 61) 0.002  (0.001)*
Constant -0.635  (0.128)*** -1.257  (0.540)**
Age
* < 25 years







sex (women = 1) -0.284  (0.211) -0.515  (0.219)** -0.241  (0.216)
Low-skilled worker -0.327  (0.193)* -0.063  (0.202) 0.255  (0.200)
Previously long-term
unemployed
-0.555  (0.189)*** 0.369  (0.200)* 0.222  (0.121)*
Previously welfare
recipient
0.317  (0.330) -0.317  (0.340) 0.121  (0.323)
Disabled -0.452  (0.415) -0.352  (0.472) 1.582  (0.430)***
Production worker -0.154  (0.473) -0.886  (0.449)* 0.593  (0.453)
Administrative
personnel
-0.096  (0.505) -0.708  (0.478) 0.057  (0.480)



















0.485  (0.209)** -1.256  (0.197)*** 0.727  (0.197)***
Increasing business
activity
0.377  (0.180)** 0.041  (0.145) 0.143  (0.112)
Firm-specific exit rate -0.200  (0.077)*** -0.031  (0.102) 0.248  (0.093)***
Firm size 0.264  (0.132)** 0.043  (0.091) 0.379  (0.095)***
σ2 1.045  (0.116)***
η
T 0.198  (0.187)
η
S 0.234  (0.188)




*** means not significantly different from zero at the 1 % level; ** means not significantly
different from zero at the 5 % level; * means not significantly different from zero at the 10 %
level.
1  The reference case is a middle-aged man who did not exit from the 'hard core of
unemployment', who works in the supervisory or management personnel of a small manufacturing
firm in the north of the country (Flandres) and who did not participate in a program.-  - 26
Table  5.  The  parameter  estimates  of  the  joint  duration  and  participation  process  taking
endogenous  sampling  into  account  -  Normal  mixing  distribution
1




process  :  training
Participation
process  :  wage
subsidies
θ1
       (0 ≤ t < 1 month) 0.168 (0.086)**
θ2     (1 ≤ t < 12) 0.006 (0.004)*
θ3     (12 ≤ t < 27) 0.045 (0.021)**
θ4     (27 ≤ t < 61) 0.001 (0.0005)*
Constant -0.632 (0.113)*** -0.979 (0.483)**
Age
* < 25 years







sex (women = 1) -0.267 (0.223) -0.510 (0.236)** -0.227 (0.233)
Low-skilled worker -0.361 (0.205)* -0.085 (0.218) 0.105 (0.217)
Previously long-term
unemployed
-0.613 (0.198)*** 0.421 (0.213)** 0.166 (0.213)
Previously welfare
recipient
0.208 (0.337) 0.041 (0.087) 0.042 (0.076)
Disabled -0.557 (0.445) -0.369 (0.501) 1.624 (0.465)***
Production worker -0.237 (0.497) -1.094 (0.490)** 0.894 (0.498)*
Administrative personnel -0.034 (0.532) -0.919 (0.524)* 0.192 (0.520)

















Brussels & the Walloon
region
0.384 (0.200)* -1.097 (0.210)*** 1.035 (0.214)***
Increasing business
activity
0.341 (0.166)** 0.056 (0.084) 0.132 (0.421)
Firm-specific exit rate -0.249 (0.083)*** -0.002 (0.105) 0.228 (0.098)**







Sample size 864 Number of parameters 63
Mean ln-L -0.399 Jeffrey-Bayes posterior
probability criterion
1116.004
*** means not significantly different from zero at the 1 % level; ** means not significantly different from zero at
the 5 % level; * means not significantly different from zero at the 10 % level.
1  The reference case is a middle-aged man who did not exit from the 'hard core of unemployment', who works in
the supervisory or management personnel of a small manufacturing firm in the north of the country (Flandres)
and who did not participate in a program.-  - 27
Table  6.  The  parameter  estimates  of  the  joint  duration  and  participation  process  taking
endogenous  sampling  into  account  -  Discrete  mixing  distribution
1








       (0 ≤ t < 1 month) 0.104 (0.057)*
θ2     (1 ≤ t < 12) 0.004 (0.003)
θ3     (12 ≤ t < 27) 0.022 (0.012)*
θ4     (27 ≤ t < 61) 0.001 (0.001)
Constant -0.326 (0.635) -1.762 (0.619)**
Age
* < 25 years







sex (women = 1) -0.252 (0.192) -0.658 (0.261)** -0.475 (0.243)**
Low-skilled worker -0.284 (0.192) 0.051 (0.260) 0.315 (0.263)
Previously long-term
unemployed




Disabled -0.319 (0.370) -0.091 (0.455) 1.584 (0.447)***
Production worker -0.027 (0.423) -0.456 (0.501) -0.184 (0.492)
Administrative personnel -0.104 (0.456) 0.148 (0.555) 0.340 (0.544)

















Brussels & the Walloon
region




Firm-specific exit rate -0.181 (0.070)*** 0.015 (0.101) 0.143 (0.096)








Sample size 864 Number of parameters 60
Mean ln-L -0.401 Jeffrey-Bayes posterior
probability criterion
1098.726
*** means not significantly different from zero at the 1 % level; ** means not significantly different from zero at
the 5 % level; * means not significantly different from zero at the 10 % level.
1  The reference case is a middle-aged man who did not exit from the 'hard core of unemployment', who works in
the supervisory or management personnel of a small manufacturing firm in the north of the country (Flandres)
and who did not participate in a program.